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Abstract
A computation scheme among n parties is fair if no party obtains the computation result
unless all other n− 1 parties obtain the same result. A fair computation scheme is optimistic if
n honest parties can obtain the computation result without resorting to a trusted third party.
We prove, for the first time, a tight lower bound on the message complexity of optimistic fair
computation for n parties among which n−1 can be malicious in an asynchronous network. We
do so by relating the optimal message complexity of optimistic fair computation to the length
of the shortest permutation sequence in combinatorics.
1 Introduction
In fair computation [1, 2], n parties possess n pieces of information and need to output a function
of these n pieces of information (the inputs) atomically. Namely, a party obtains the output of the
function if and only if the other n − 1 parties obtain the same output. A prominent example is
auctions: after n parties offer a price for some item, they wish to determine the highest price and
the winner without ambiguity, e.g., when more than one party claims to win the item. A solution
is the fair computation of the n bids (prices).
The difficulty of fair computation stems from the fact that a party might be malicious (dis-
honest) and try to obtain other parties’ inputs, twist other parties’ outputs, or arbitrarily delay
other parties from obtaining an output. Still, honest parties should eventually obtain an output in
a fair manner: they should all obtain the function of the n inputs, or all obtain a specific value ⊥
(denoted abort in [1]). In fact, (deterministic) fair computation is in general impossible without a
trusted third party [3]. Yet, this third party is not needed in every execution of a (deterministic)
fair computation protocol.
Optimistic (deterministic) fair computation stipulates that the third party does not need to
be invoked if all n parties are honest [1, 2], [4]. An execution where n honest parties output
without invoking the third party is called an optimistic execution [1], [4]. Given that cheating is
seldom and the third party is considered a bottleneck, optimism is practically appealing. To claim
true practicality, however, optimistic executions should be efficient. To be specific, the number of
messages exchanged among n honest parties (which compute the function without resorting to the
third party) should not be prohibitive. Until the present paper, the optimal number of messages
was unknown.
We prove in this paper that ` + 2n − 3 is the optimal number of messages that an optimistic
execution of optimistic fair computation may achieve in the presence of n− 1 potentially malicious
parties in an asynchronous network, where ` is the length of the shortest sequence that contains all
permutations of n symbols as subsequences [5]. Given recent results in combinatorics [6, 7, 8, 9],
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the optimal number of messages for optimistic fair computation is 4 for n = 2, n2 +1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 7,
and asymptotically Θ(n2) for n ≥ 8.1
The main idea behind our proof of the `+ 2n− 3 lower-bound is the identification of a decision
propagation pattern according to which the n parties reach an agreement when any of the parties
decides to stop the computation. Such ability of a party to stop at any time without jeopardizing
fairness has been called timely termination [1]. It prevents an honest party from waiting forever
and is crucial in an asynchronous context. The decision propagation pattern is between at least
two parties P and Q. To get an intuition, consider an optimistic execution E, let event EP =“P
does not receive message mP ” and let event EQ =“Q does not receive message mQ”. An honest
party P ’s stop is a result of EP . However, a malicious P ’s stop can impose an honest Q’s stop: if
when P and Q complete E, E¯P (the complement of EP ) occurs before E¯Q and Q does not receive
any message between E¯P and E¯Q, then without mQ, Q is unable to distinguish whether EP really
occurs or not. An immediate result is that malicious P ’s decision may propagate to Q. To prevent
fairness from being jeopardized by malicious propagation, in the context of possibly n−1 malicious
parties, every party should participate in this propagation so that none has a chance to pretend
being honest in front of the trusted third party T .
This yields a subsequence of n events EP (one for each party P ) and n messages (whose
destinations are the n parties) in E. Clearly, the order of the parties does not matter and therefore,
any permutation of the n events must occur as a subsequence in E. Hence the relation between
the least number of messages of an optimistic execution and `, the length of the shortest sequence
that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences.
Our lower-bound on the number of messages is tight in the following sense. We present an
(` + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme of some function f given a shortest per-
mutation sequence s. Our protocol, where the n parties are honest and compute without the third
party, consists of three phases: (a) the n parties send verifiable encryption [12] of their n inputs
respectively, in order to recover those inputs (if needed) in a non-optimistic execution, which de-
fines the first n messages; (b) the n parties exchange ` − 2 messages defined by s; and (c) the n
parties exchange the concatenation of the n inputs, which defines the last n − 1 messages. The
` − 2 messages m1m2 . . .m`−2 in phase (b) have their sources and destinations defined by the se-
quence s = s1s2 . . . s` as follows. The party represented by symbol sj is the source of mj−1 for
j = 2, . . . , `−1, and the destination of mj−2 for j = 3, 4, . . . , `. (s1 is the source of the last message
m0 of phase (a) and s2 is the destination of m0.) When a party resorts to T in a non-optimistic
execution, T uses the decision propagation pattern to decide an output. The pattern is the same
as in our proof of the lower-bound so that the number of messages in every optimistic execution is
minimal.
As we will explain in Section 5, many results have been published on problems related to fair
computation [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. None implies our lower-bound. On the other hand, our
(` + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme can be used to implement fair exchange
of certain digital signatures (including Schnorr signatures [19], DSS signatures [20], Fiat-Shamir
signatures [21], Ong-Schnorr signatures [22], GQ signatures [23]). Thus, our scheme is also a
message-optimal optimistic fair exchange scheme [1]. Moreover, combined with our proof of the
lower-bound, this optimistic fair exchange scheme of digital signatures also implies that `+ 2n− 3
is the optimal number of messages for optimistic fair contract signing [16]. Finally, our optimal
message complexity may be considered as a first step to the optimal (round) complexity. For
1Newey [6] (and then many others [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]) studied the length ` of the shortest permutation sequence.
Although Newey [6] showed that ` = 3 for n = 2, and ` = n2 − 2n + 4 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 7, the exact ` for n ≥ 8 is still
considered as an open problem [7, 8]. Up until now, the best upper-bound is dn2 − 7
3
n + 19
3
e for n ≥ 7 [8], while a
lower-bound of ` is of the form n2 − cn7/4 +  for some constant c and some  > 0 [9].
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example, the decision propagation pattern is applicable for any optimistic execution, no matter
whether the protocol is in a similar form as our optimal protocol or not.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our general model and defines
optimistic fair computation. Section 3 presents our lower-bound on the number of messages. Section
4 presents our (`+ 2n− 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme. Section 5 discusses related
work. We defer the details of the proof of our lower-bound to Appendix A and the details of the
correctness proof of our message-optimal scheme to Appendix B.
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 The parties
We consider a set Ω of n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn (sometimes also denoted by P , Q). These parties
are all interactive in the sense that they can communicate with each other by exchanging messages.
All parties are computationally-bounded [24] in the sense that they run in time polynomial in some
security parameter s.2
In addition to the n parties, we also assume a computationally-bounded trusted third party
T . T follows the protocol assigned to it. The communication with T is such that when T is
communicating with P , Q needs to wait for Q’s turn to communicate with T for any two parties
P,Q ∈ Ω.
At most n − 1 parties can be malicious. A malicious party could deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol assigned to it. A malicious party could interact arbitrarily with the others as well as T .
For example, a malicious party may drop certain messages. A party that crashes at some point
in time is considered as a malicious party that drops all the messages from that point. Malicious
parties may also collude (e.g., to obtain an output for themselves and to prevent an output to an
honest party, i.e., to break fairness, which is defined later).
Communication channels do not modify, inject, duplicate or lose messages. Every message sent
eventually reaches its destination. Any modified, injected, duplicate, or lost message is considered to
be due to malicious parties. The delay on message transmission is finite but unbounded. Messages
could be reordered. Communication channels are authenticated and secure such as Transport Layer
Security [25]. No party can be masqueraded and no message can be eavesdropped.
2.2 Fair computation
We consider the problem of optimistic fair computation in the classical sense of [2, 1]. The problem
involves a deterministic function f to be computed by the n parties. Function f is agreed upon by
the n parties in advance. We assume that f takes n strings x1 ∈ {0, 1}`1 , x2 ∈ {0, 1}`2 , . . . , xn ∈
{0, 1}`n as inputs and returns z ∈ {0, 1}`z as its output.
Definition 1 (Computation). A computation scheme for f is a collection (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) of n
algorithms. The algorithms can carry out two protocols:3
2Hereafter, when we say that a probability is negligible, we mean that the probability is a negligible function g(s)
of the security parameter s; i.e., ∀c ∈ N, ∃C ∈ N such that ∀s > C, g(s) < 1
sc
.
3We consider deterministic protocols here (for Compute and Stop). In this paper, deterministic protocols consists
of two classes of protocols: D1 and D2. In any protocol of D1, each party runs a deterministic algorithm and sends
deterministic messages; and we define D2 based on D1: for any protocol pi1 in class D1, we can create a protocol pi2
in class D2 such that pi1 and pi2 are the same except for the message contents of pi2 which can be randomized.
3
• Compute: Each party Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is initialized with a local input xi. If Pi finishes this
protocol, Pi returns a local output which can take a value in {0, 1}`z ∪ {⊥}. If Compute is
interrupted by Stop (which we introduce below), Compute returns the same output as Stop.
• Stop: Pi invokes Stop when Pi wants to stop the computation. Pi can invoke this protocol
at any point in time. Pi obtains Pi’s status of Compute so far (i.e., the sequence of messages
that have arrived at Pi so far) as a local input to Stop. Pi makes a local output which can
take a value in {0, 1}`z ∪ {⊥}.
In the classical definition of fair computation [2], the problem is defined in the simulatability
paradigm [26], which basically expresses a solution to fair computation in terms of a simulation of
the ideal process. In what follows, we recall the notion of the ideal process in Definition 2, and then
fair computation in Definition 3.
Definition 2 (Ideal process [2]). The ideal process for fair computation of f is a collection
(P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n, U) of n + 1 algorithms. Each P¯i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is initialized with a local in-
put xi. U is parameterized by f . P¯i sends message ai = xi to U . Messages are delivered instantly.
U returns a message mi to Pi according to Equation (1) as soon as a1, a2, . . . , an have arrived at U
or one message of ⊥ has arrived at U . P¯i outputs whatever U returns to it.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},mi =
{
f(a1, a2, . . . , an) if a1 6= ⊥, a2 6= ⊥, . . . , an 6= ⊥
⊥ if ⊥ ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , an}
(1)
The process is ideal in the sense that among n + 1 parties, the information of a private input
is only exposed to the universally trusted U , which we explain in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Fair computation4). A computation scheme α solves fair computation for f [2] if it
satisfies the following properties:
• Fairness: for any e ∈ N, 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1 and any e malicious parties Pd1 , Pd2 , . . . , Pde , for
any computationally-bounded algorithm A that controls the e malicious parties5, there ex-
ists a computationally-bounded algorithm S that controls P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de6 such that for
any x1, x2, . . . , xn, OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are compu-
tationally indistinguishable [27, 28];
• Termination: If an honest party Pi invokes Stop, then Pi eventually outputs.
• Completeness: ∀x1, x2, . . . , xn, if P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all
parties output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn); if P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and some invokes Stop, then
either all parties output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), or all parties output ⊥.
• Non-triviality : There is at least one execution in which P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none
invokes Stop.
4The original definition in [2] is ambiguous when all parties are honest: (1) if an algorithm A delays every
message, then to ensure termination, every honest party should output ⊥ at some point in time. However, for every
computationally-bounded algorithm S, the first n elements of the joint output OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are the
same: z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Then by the original definition, all honest parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn output z, except with
negligible probability, which yields a contradiction; and (2) if in a protocol, all parties send no message and only
outputs ⊥, then this protocol also matches the ideal process, which however is a trivial protocol.
5A also plays the role of the asynchronous network as defined in Section 2.1.
6In the ideal process, S sees xd1 , xd2 , . . . , xde , may change ad1 , ad2 , . . . , ade and also sees md1 ,md2 , . . . ,mde but S
cannot see other messages from or to U , or U ’s internal state (which makes U universally trusted.
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Assumptions and notations:
• W.l.o.g., Pd1 , Pd2 , . . . , Pde output nothing but A may output arbitrarily, 7 and similarly,
P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de output nothing but S may output arbitrarily; and
• OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) denotes the joint output of P1, P2, . . . , Pn,A when running α for
inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn, andOP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) denotes the joint output of P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n,S
when running the ideal process for inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn.
Definition 4 (Optimistic fair computation). A fair computation scheme is optimistic [1] if it
satisfies the following property.
• Optimism: ∀x1, x2, . . . , xn, if P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties
output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without interacting with T .
When P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, P1, P2, . . . , Pn carry out Compute only.
Thus, an optimistic execution is an execution of Compute, where every party finishes all commu-
nication steps of Compute and outputs.
We focus on the class C of function f such that for any x1 ∈ {0, 1}`1 , x2 ∈ {0, 1}`2 , . . . , xn ∈
{0, 1}`n , no computationally-bounded algorithm is able to output f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) using only n−1
out of the n strings, except with negligible probability.8 For a function f in the complement of C,
a protocol that solves optimistic fair computation can still be vulnerable to the following attack: a
subset of parties colludes, leaves with the evaluation of f immediately but an honest party outputs
⊥. In the literature [29, 30], fair protocols for the complement of C are considered, but they ensure
fairness different from Definition 2 and Definition 3, and are not the focus here. We also assume
that T does not have prior knowledge of x1, x2, . . . , xn, and therefore no computationally-bounded
algorithm, even with the help of T , is able to compute z from any n − 1 out of the n inputs of
P1, P2, . . . , Pn. We call this assumption no prior knowledge of T .
3 Lower Bound
In this section, we prove our lower-bound on the number of messages exchanged during an optimistic
execution of optimistic fair computation. Recall that we consider those functions that cannot be
evaluated by only a subset of n parties, e.g., we do not consider constant functions. In addition, a
scheme (or the Compute protocol of a scheme) which sends no message, invokes Stop and outputs
⊥ only is excluded by the non-triviality property (Definition 3). Thus the lower-bound is non-zero.
In Theorem 1, we express our lower bound in terms of n and `, the length of the shortest
sequence that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences.
Theorem 1 (Message complexity). For any function f ∈ C, for any optimistic fair computation
scheme for f (for n parties, among which n− 1 can be malicious), the n parties exchange at least
`+ 2n− 3 messages in every optimistic execution.
Proof sketch. (The full proof is in Appendix A.)
To prove Theorem 1, we view every optimistic execution E as a sequence of messages ordered
according to when they reach their destinations respectively. We first pinpoint two necessary
7The assumption that a malicious party outputs nothing is for definition only. In practice, a malicious party may
output arbitrarily.
8For example, f = x1 ·x2 · · ·xn is not in C (since if one of the values is 0, the output is 0 with probability 1) while
f = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn is.
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messages in E, and then we show that between these two messages, there must exist certain
patterns of messages.
Intuitively, when starting E, no party knows anything about other parties’ inputs; there is a
border-line message m∗1 such that, after m∗1 reaches its destination, one and only one party knows
something about all the other parties’ inputs. If any honest party Pi ∈ Ω stops before m∗1 arrives
at its destination, then Pi is unable to output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) with non-negligible probability
by no prior knowledge of T .
By the end of E, every party receives sufficient messages to compute z (by the optimism prop-
erty); there is another border-line message m∗2 such that, after m∗2 reaches its destination, one and
only one party has sufficient messages to compute z. If any honest party Pi stops after m
∗
2 arrives
at its destination, Pi outputs z by the completeness property (e.g., with the help of T , which might
not be the only way and is not necessarily so for the proof). Figure 1a illustrates the two messages.
m*1 m
*
2
⊥ ⊥ … ⊥ z z … z
(a) Pi outputs ⊥ if Pi stops before m∗1; and z if
Pi stops after m
∗
2
m*1 m
*
2
Pj claims no mj and 
decides v
Pi has to 
decide v
mj mi
(b) Pi decides the same value v after Pj if Pi
stops between m∗1 and m
∗
2.
Figure 1: The output of Pi if Pi stops at some point in execution E
What Pi should output if it stops between m
∗
1 and m
∗
2 requires a closer look. Suppose that
when Pi wants to stop, Pi has not received some message mi. (We clarify some terminology here.
When we say that Pi has not received or does not receive some message mi, we mean that Pi has
not received mi but received every message with destination Pi before mi in E. The same for
other parties.) When Pi wants to stop, either no other party has decided an output (and then Pi
can easily decide), or some party Pj ∈ Ω, j 6= i has decided. If Pj claims that it has not received
message mj and mi is the first message with destination Pi after mj in E, , then Pi must adopt Pj ’s
decision, or in other words, Pj ’s decision propagates to Pi. Because n− 1 parties can be malicious,
Pi is unable to distinguish whether Pj ’s claim is honest or not and then Pi has to decide the same
output as Pj (except with negligible probability) by the fairness property. Figure 1b illustrates
this agreement.
This agreement between two parties induces a decision propagation pattern, which gives rise
to a certain pattern of messages in E: after a message mj with destination Pj , there must exist a
message mi with destination Pi so that Pj could enforce Pi on the same output if (a) Pj does not
receive mj , (b) Pj invokes Stop and outputs ⊥, and (c) Pi does not receive mi and invokes Stop.
We use this decision propagation pattern to build the following scenario. Suppose one party
P1 stops before m
∗
1 arrives at its destination and then the other n − 1 parties stop following the
decision propagation pattern above: for k = 1, we denote by m1 the message which P1 has not
received when P1 stops; then for k = 2, 3, . . . , n, if there is a message mk in E that is the first
message with destination Pk between mk−1 and m∗2 , then Pk stops when Pk has not received mk,
and if not, Pk stops after m
∗
2 arrives at its destination.
Clearly, if the pattern of the n messages whose destinations are P1, P2, . . . , Pn does not exist
between m∗1 and m∗2 in E, then Pn would output z by the property of m∗2. However, P1, as well
as other parties P2, P3, . . . , Pk for which messages m2,m3, . . . ,mk exist, would output ⊥ by the
property of m∗1 and decision propagation. This would violate the fairness property. Therefore, the
pattern of the n messages whose destinations are n parties, or in fact any permutation of the n
parties must exist as a subsequence of E between between m∗1 and m∗2.
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Thus, the number of messages between m∗1 and m∗2 (inclusive) of E is at least `. In the mean-
time, in E, before m∗1, there are at least n − 1 messages to meet the definition of m∗1 and after
m∗2, there are at least n− 2 messages to meet the definition of m∗2. We add together the minimum
numbers of messages before m∗1, after m∗2 and between m∗1 and m∗2, and then have `+ 2n− 3 as the
final minimum number of messages during every optimistic execution.
4 An Optimal Protocol
To prove that ` + 2n − 3 is a tight lower bound, we describe in this section an (` + 2n − 3)-
message optimistic fair computation scheme for the function that implements fair exchange of
some items. This shows that the optimal message complexity can be achieved for some optimistic
fair computation scheme.
Our optimal protocol relies on a publicly verifiable transcript. I.e., each destination can verify
in an execution whether previous messages have arrived at their destinations correctly. This is
realized by adding digital signatures [24, 31]. To help T recover the n inputs (if necessary) when
some party invokes Stop, the n parties exchange verifiable encryption [12] of the n inputs in the
protocol that computes without the third party. Section 4.1 recalls the basics of digital signatures
and verifiable encryption, before describing our optimal protocol.
4.1 Preliminaries
We denote a digital signature on message m by σ = Sigsk(m), and the verification algorithm by
V erpk(σ,m), where pk is a public key and sk is the corresponding secret key. Sometimes we denote
the signature of party Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} simply by Sigi(m).
A digital signature scheme is secure if no adversary is able to forge a signature even after seeing
polynomially many valid signatures. See [24, 31] for a discussion on digital signature schemes and
their levels of security.
A verifiable encryption scheme is a recovery algorithm D and a two-party protocol between
prover P and verifier V [12]. To run the two-party protocol, P and V ’s common inputs are public
key vk, public value x, condition κ and binary relation R; P takes witness w as an extra input. At
the end of the protocol, if (x,w) /∈ R, V rejects and outputs ⊥; if V accepts, then V obtains string
α such that D(sk, κ, α) = w and (x,w) ∈ R.
We denote an instance of verifiable encryption by V E(vk, κ, w, x,R). Roughly speaking, a
verifiable encryption scheme is secure if no malicious verifier is able to learn w without sk and
no malicious prover is able to make V accept αˆ which gives wˆ by D but (x, wˆ) /∈ R, except with
negligible probability. See [12] for a formal definition of security for verifiable encryption schemes.
A prominent example of verifiable encryption is Asokan et al.’s non-interactive constructions of
verifiable encryption for a list of digital signature schemes, which includes Schnorr signatures, DSS
signatures, Fiat-Shamir signatures, Ong-Schnorr signatures and GQ signatures [1].
4.2 Protocol description
In this section, we prove that the lower-bound of `+ 2n− 3 messages is tight (Theorem 2) and we
show the tightness in a constructive way.
Theorem 2. There exists an optimistic fair computation scheme for some function f where n
honest parties can evaluate f after they exchange exactly `+ 2n− 3 messages without resorting to
T (i.e., in every optimistic execution).
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Algorithm 1 Compute pi
Require: a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}
Ensure: (l + 2n− 3)-message Compute pi
1: Build sequence j:
j1, j2, . . . , jn−2, i, jn+l−1, jn+l, . . . , jl+2n−3
where (a) j1, j2, . . . , jn−2, i1 are n− 1 different symbols; and (b) il, jn+l−1, jn+l, . . . , jl+2n−3 are
n different symbols.
2: Set j0 = {1, 2, . . . , n}\{i1, j1, j2, . . . , jn−2}.
3: In pi, Pjk−1 sends a message mk−1 to Pjk upon receiving mk−2 for k = 1, 2, . . . , l+2n−3 (except
Pj0 who sends m0 = V Ej0 upon initialization) where
mk−1 =

mk−2||V Ejk−1 ||Sigjk−1(mk−2||V Ejk−1) 2 ≤ k ≤ n
mk−2||Sigjk−1(mk−2) n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ end(jk−1)
mk−2||xjk−1 ||Sigjk−1(mk−2||xjk−1) end(jk−1) + 1 ≤ k ≤ l + n− 2
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) l + n− 1 ≤ k ≤ l + 2n− 3
(2)
and
V Ejk−1 = V E(vkT , κ, xjk−1 , ajk−1 , Rjk−1);
κ = (a1, R1), (a2, R2), . . . , (an, Rn), which identifies the intended x1, x2, . . . , xn;
end(jk−1) = max
K∈{1,2,...,l}
{K|iK = jk−1}+ n− 2
4: P1, P2, . . . , Pn output z = (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
We build our protocol with Compute pi (Algorithm 1) and Stop µ (Algorithm 2) given any
sequence that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let l be the length of the sequence.
We then show in Theorem 3 that our protocol is an (l+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation
scheme for the following function:
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) (ai, xi) ∈ Ri for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
⊥ otherwise (3)
where R1, R2, . . . , Rn are n relations that allow non-interactive construction of verifiable encryption
and a1, a2, . . . , an are n public values.
9 R1, R2, . . . , Rn, a1, a2, . . . , an are included in the public
description of f .
The one-time setup of the protocol is not included in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Before
pi and µ are carried out, a one-time setup (a) distributes necessary keys: T ’s public key vkT and
secret key skT , n parties’ public and secret keys correctly; (b) distributes the public description of
f correctly; and (c) executes the one-time setup of the verifiable encryption. (If implemented, a
trusted party Certificate Authority [32] can do this one-time setup.)
Some remarks on µ are in order: (a) as each part of the request message is publicly verifiable,
T is able to efficiently verify whether a party P ’s request and P ’s claim are consistent by following
Equation (2); and (b) P may invoke Stop at any point in time10, e.g., when a message received by
9We also assume that for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, given ai, any computationally-bounded algorithm outputs xi with
negligible probability, and given (ai, xi) such that (ai, xi) ∈ Ri, any computationally-bounded algorithm outputs
yi, yi 6= xi such that (ai, yi) ∈ Ri with negligible probability.
10If messages are delivered instantly, P does not invoke Stop.
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Algorithm 2 Stop µ
Require: sequence j of length l + 2n− 3 built for pi
Ensure: Stop µ that accompanies pi
1: For any k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , l+ 2n− 3}, Pjk invokes µ when Pjk wants to stop in pi; otherwise, if pi has
not started, the n parties output ⊥, or if pi has finished, the n parties output (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
2: For k = 0, when invoking µ, if Pjk has not sent mk, Pjk quietly leaves pi and µ and outputs ⊥.
3: For 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, when invoking µ, if Pjk has not received mk−1 correctly, Pjk quietly leaves
pi and µ and outputs ⊥.
4: For n ≤ k ≤ l+2n−3, let Ik = {index|jindex = jk, index ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k−1}}, let lastk = max Ik
when Ik 6= ∅ and let lastk = 0 when Ik = ∅, and define m−1 as an empty string. Then, for
n ≤ k ≤ l + 2n − 3, when invoking µ, if Pjk has not received mk−1 correctly and has received
mlastk−1, then Pjk sends to T message reqk = mlastk . By sending reqk, Pjk claims that Pjk
does not receive mk−1.
5: T verifies that reqk is consistent with Pjk ’s claim; and T calculates response
resp =

‘‘aborted” if reqk and Pjk ’s claim are not consistent
or Pjk has sent a request before
z = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) else if variable z (which is initialized to ⊥) is not ⊥
“aborted” else if reqk does not contain V E1, V E2, . . . , V En
z ← (x1, x2, . . . , xn) else if k > minindex∈{progress+1,...,l+2n−3}{index|jindex = jk}
and xi ← D(skT , κ, V Ei) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
z ← (x1, x2, . . . , xn) else if k ≥ l + n− 1
and xi ← D(skT , κ, V Ei) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
“aborted” otherwise
T updates progress (which is initialized to 0) to k if k > progress, reqk and Pjk ’s claim are
consistent and Pjk has not sent a request before. T then sends resp to Pjk .
6: Pjk outputs ⊥ if resp =“aborted”; and Pjk outputs z if resp = z.
P in pi is incorrect, or when P is impatient while waiting for some message; our protocol allows
every party to define their own strategy of invoking Stop, independent of the other n− 1 parties.
We prove that this protocol (consisting of pi and µ), given a shortest permutation sequence,
is an (` + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme (of which the proof is deferred to
Appendix B). This implies Theorem 2. Combined with Theorem 1, ` + 2n − 3 is thus a tight
lower-bound on the number of messages for optimistic fair computation.
Theorem 3. Given a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}, the
protocol consisting of pi and µ is an (l + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme for
function f in Equation (3) in an asynchronous network with n− 1 potentially malicious parties.
In fact, function f implements fair exchange among n parties for items x1, x2, . . . , xn that satisfy
relations R1, R2, . . . , Rn. Then Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 form a compiler that can transform
a shortest permutation sequence into an (`+ 2n− 3)-message optimistic fair exchange scheme. An
application is a message-optimal optimistic fair exchange scheme of digital signatures [1].11
11In the application of fair exchange of digital signatures, Ri is an homomorphism θ depending on the given digital
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5 Related Work
5.1 Optimistic fair computation
Cachin and Camenisch [2] formalized optimistic fair computation for two parties and a third party
T (that can also be malicious). Asokan et al. [1] formalized optimistic fair exchange of digital
signatures between two parties and T (where T is honest). In this paper, we assume that T is
honest. We briefly compare here the two definitions above. Cachin and Camenisch [2] formalized
fair computation using the simulatability paradigm [26], while Asokan et al. [1] formalized fair
exchange through games [24]. As the former can provide stronger security guarantee, we follow
the definition of fair computation in [2]. Both formalizations consider the termination property in
an asynchronous setting. We model this property using Stop, which is equivalent to the signal of
termination in [1]. Asokan et al. [1] also defined the completeness property regarding the case where
all parties are honest, while there is an ambiguity regarding this case in [2]. We adapt the definition
of the completeness property from [1]. The optimism property was defined differently in [1] and [2].
In [2], the trusted party does not communicate with the n parties when n parties are honest and
messages are delivered instantly, whereas in [1], the trusted party does not communicate with the
n parties, when n parties are honest but the asynchronous network is allowed to deliver messages
arbitrarily. We adopt the optimism property from [1], as it provides a stronger guarantee. Following
Asokan et al.’s work [1], Ku¨pc¸u¨ and Lysyanskaya [33] defined optimism similarly in games.
In addition, we include the non-triviality property to rule out trivial protocols that send no
message and abort all the time. (Our proof of the lower-bound is based on the existence of at
least one optimistic execution guaranteed by non-triviality and optimism, but our fair computation
scheme, on the other hand, allows arbitrarily many optimistic executions.)
5.2 Optimistic fair exchange
For two parties, Asokan et al. [1] proposed a 4-message optimistic fair exchange scheme that ensures
termination. Since ` = 3 for two parties, our Theorem 1 shows that the 4-message fair exchange
scheme is optimal for two parties. This also implies that a 3-message fair exchange scheme does not
meet all of the required properties. For example, the optimistic fair exchange scheme proposed in
[4] was criticized by Asokan et al. [1] as not ensuring termination. Another example is Ateniese’s
3-message optimistic fair exchange scheme [34], which also does not ensure termination as noted
by the author himself [34]. A recent follow-up work [35] has the same drawback.
To the best of our knowledge, up to this paper (and our our fair computation scheme), no
message-optimal optimistic fair exchange or optimistic fair computation scheme among n parties
for an arbitrary n (with n− 1 potentially malicious parties) has been proposed.
5.3 Optimal optimistic schemes
We explain here the relation between the optimal efficiency of optimistic schemes of related problems
and our optimal message efficiency. Pfitzmann, Schunter, and Waidner (PSW) [16] determined the
optimal efficiency of fair two-party contract signing, Schunter [17] determined the optimal efficiency
of fair two-party certified email, whereas Dashti [18] determined the optimal efficiency of two-party
fair exchange in the crash-recovery model with no amnesia [36]. None of these results implies our
Theorem 1, even only for n = 2. For PSW’s result as well as Schunter’s result, this is because there
signature scheme [1], and each of the first n messages of pi is appended with an image of θ such that its pre-image
produces a correct signature.
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is no reduction of the problem of fair computation to the problem of fair contract signing12 or fair
certified email; for Dashti’s result, this is because our model can be considered as the Byzantine
failure model [36], and is thus stronger than the model considered by Dashti. Our proof of the
lower-bound, together with our message-optimal scheme, can be applied to prove that ` + 2n − 3
is the optimal message efficiency of fair n-party contract signing in the model of PSW. The special
case where n = 2 can be used to prove PSW’s result, while PSW’s proof was, unfortunately, flawed.
Draper-Gil et al. [37] determined the minimal message complexity of contract signing schemes
with weak fairness on four topologies. Weak fairness implies that the honest parties might have
different outputs as long as they can prove their honest behavior. On the contrary, our optimal
message efficiency ` + 2n − 3 applies to any topology, and employs a stronger fairness definition
than [37]. Thus their result does not imply our Theorem 1 and vice versa.
5.4 The shortest permutation sequence
Mauw, Radomirovic´ and Dashti (MRD) [13] proved that the optimal number of messages of totally-
ordered fair contract signing schemes13 falls between ` + n − 1 and ` + 2n − 3. Later, Mauw
and Radomirovic´ (MR) [15] generalized the result of MRD to DAG-ordered fair contract signing
schemes14. Both [13] and [15] considered fair contract signing as fair exchange of digital signatures.
They use a model different from PSW, and fall within the coverage of our Theorem 1. Neither
MRD’s result nor MR’s result implies our Theorem 1. Neither allows arbitrarily interleaved mes-
sages as our Theorem 1; instead, they assume that communication steps are either totally ordered or
ordered following a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In addition, both results [13, 15] propose a range
of the optimal efficiency for fair exchange, instead of a concrete lower-bound for fair computation
in general (as does our Theorem 1).
It is important to note that our Theorem 1 is not a generalization of MRD’s result nor of MR’s
result. What MRD or MR count are the messages sent from some signer. This makes the proof
difficult to extend: after a message m leaves its source s, due to the asynchronous network, m does
not help s’s knowledge about other parties’ possible states. Thus m should not help s reach an
agreement if s wants to stop after sending m, unless the messages after m are defined and ordered
in advance. On the contrary, what we count throughout our proof are the messages received (or
not) at a destination d, which affects d’s stop event. This is the key in our case for not requiring
any ordering.
Another crucial concept used by MRD is the idea of an idealized protocol. An idealized protocol
is informally defined as a totally-ordered fair exchange protocol of which the number of messages in
an optimistic execution is optimal [13]. (Here a protocol is equivalent as a Compute protocol in our
Definition 1. The communication with a third party T is not considered as part of the protocol.)
At the end phase of the idealized protocol, each of the n signers is supposed to send exactly one
message [13]. It is not clear yet whether the assumption can be justified or not: the main theorem
in [13] relates the end of an idealized protocol with part of the shortest permutation sequence;
however, (the form of the end of) the shortest permutation sequence is still open for a large n [5].
This also leads to a non-optimal fair exchange protocol in [13] and a non-optimal protocol compiler
in [14] which generates a protocol specification of an optimistic fair contract signing scheme given a
shortest permutation sequence.15 Compared with MRD’s idealized protocol, our proof of Theorem
12The main difference is that contract signing outputs a proof which binds a contract agreed in advance while
computation usually does not require such binding.
13In a totally-ordered contract signing scheme, signers execute totally-ordered communication steps; i.e., at any
point in time, only one signer has sufficient messages to calculate and send the next message.
14In a DAG-ordered contract signing scheme, communication steps can be ordered in a directed acyclic graph.
15Although [14] proved that the resulting protocol needs at least ` + 2n − 3 messages in an optimistic execution,
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1 shows that, at the end of an optimal protocol, each of the n parties may receive exactly one
message, and moreover, the end of an optimal protocol is not related to the shortest permutation
sequence. We believe that this has further implications on the design of correct and efficient fair
computation protocols.
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A Appendix. Proof of Theorem 1
We give a detailed proof of Theorem 1. First, we give the (weak) fairness property that we use
repeatedly in the proof.
Lemma 1. For any e ∈ N, any 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1, any e malicious parties and any computationally-
bounded algorithm A that controls the e malicious parties, ∀x1, x2, . . . , xn, any two honest parties
Pi, Pj , i, j,∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} output the same except with negligible probability.
We show that this property is implied the fairness property in Definition 3. Before proving the
property, we give formal definitions and terminologies used in Definition 3 such as computational
indistinguishability [27, 28] and negligible function.
Definition 5 (Computationally indistinguishability). If function g is a negligible function of vari-
able s, then ∀c ∈ N, ∃C ∈ N such that ∀s > C, g(s) < 1sc .
Let A = {A(1s, a)} be a distribution ensemble, i.e., random variables indexed by 1s and a.
Let B(1s, a) = {B(1s, a)} be also a distribution ensemble. Then A and B are computationally
indistinguishable, if for any computationally-bounded algorithm D(1s, a, w,D) that takes some
q = q(s) independently identically distributed random variables following the distribution D,
|Pr[D(1s, a, w,A(1s, a)) = 1]− Pr[D(1s, a, w,B(1s, a)) = 1]| = negl(s), ∀a,∀w
where negl(s) is a negligible function of s, q(s) is a polynomial of s and the probabilities are taken
over the random choices of D as well as q random variables.
In the context of Definition 3, s is the security parameter of the fair computation scheme.
Recall that in Definition 3, we say that the joint outputs O = OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and
O¯ = OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are computationally indistinguishable. This means that for any
computationally-bounded algorithm D(1s, a, w,D),
|Pr[D(1s, a, w,O) = 1]− Pr[D(1s, a, w, O¯) = 1]| = negl(s), ∀a,∀w
where a = x1||x2|| · · · ||xn, w may be arbitrary auxiliary information and both O and O¯ are indexed
by 1s and a.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a computationally-bounded algorithm A that does not control Pi or
Pj . I.e., both Pi and Pj are honest as in the statement of Lemma 1. Note that although A controls
the rest of the parties, A can be an arbitrary algorithm, including running the rest of the parties
honestly (and thus the proof applies to any execution as in the statement of Lemma 1.)
Let oi, oj be the random variables that represent Pi and Pj ’s outputs in the joint output O
respectively. Suppose that A controls e, 1 ≤ e ≤ n− 1 malicious parties Pd1 , Pd2 , . . . , Pde .
By Definition 3, there exists a computationally-bounded algorithm S that controls P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . ,
P¯de such that O and O¯ are computationally indistinguishable. Let o¯i and o¯j be the random variables
that represent P¯i and P¯j ’s outputs in the joint output O¯ respectively. Since S does not control P¯i
or P¯j , o¯i = o¯j with probability 1.
Consider a computationally-bounded algorithm D that tries to distinguish O and O¯ as follows.
D takes one sample from the given distribution D. If in the sample, the ith element and the jth
element are the same, then D outputs 1; if not, D outputs 0. Then there exists a negligible function
negl(s) such that
|Pr[D(1s, a, w,O) = 1]− Pr[D(1s, a, w, O¯) = 1]| = negl(s),∀a
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where a = x1||x2|| · · · ||xn and w is an empty string.
Since o¯i = o¯j with probability 1, Pr[D(1s, a, w, O¯) = 1] = 1. Let ρ be the probability such that
oi = oj . Then Pr[D(1s, a, w,O) = 1] = ρ. Thus ρ = 1−negl(s). I.e., for any algorithm A, any two
honest parties Pi, Pj , i, j,∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} output the same except with negligible probability..
Then, we discuss some essential properties/convention of Stop, which we use later in the proof.
Preliminaries. If P invokes Stop several times, Stop returns the same value as the first time.
P may communicate with T in Stop, but P does not communicate with T in Compute. This is
consistent to the optimism property.
When P invokes Stop, either P does not send messages to any other party including T and
simply terminates, or P communicates with T and then terminates. If P communicates with T , P
sends only one stop request. T does not ask any party (including P ) for additional messages when
computing an output for P . This is due to the atomicity of the communication with T and the
termination property.
When P communicates with T and then terminates, T sends a response only to P . In the
asynchronous network, even if T sends messages to parties other than P , they might receive the
messages after they complete Compute or Stop in the worst case. Thus we consider that T does
not send messages to other parties.
We say that an optimistic execution E is initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn, if n parties in E are
initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn. When we discuss any optimistic execution E, E must have been
initialized with some n strings. Thus the term E initialized with (some) x1, x2, . . . , xn does not
lose generality.
Sometimes we denote a party by O, P , Q, R, with an abuse of notations on O and R (as their
meaning is clear in the context).
Recall the intuition (Section 3) that there are two necessary messages (of every optimistic
execution). Here we precisely define the two messages and show their basic properties.
Lemma 2. For any optimistic execution E, for any two parties P and Q, we say that P contacts
Q in E if one of the two properties below holds: (a) P sends m to Q in E; or (b) there exists a
party O such that P contacts O and subsequently O contacts Q.
Then for any optimistic execution E and any P ∈ Ω, there exists a message m such that before
m arrives at its destination, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P} such that Q has not contacted P yet and after m arrives
at its destination, ∀Q ∈ Ω\{P}, Q has contacted the destination P .
Let t be any status of P before P receives m in E. Then if P invokes Stop with t and no other
party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P .
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. We first prove the existence of message m.
By contradiction. Suppose that for some optimistic execution E initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn
and some P ∈ Ω, after E finishes, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P} has not contacted P yet. Then by the optimism
property, P performs a computationally-bounded algorithm that computes f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) given
Ω\{Q}’s inputs. A contradiction.
Second, we prove that if P invokes Stop with t and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop
returns ⊥ to P . Since no other party has invoked Stop, Stop is only able to return to P a value
based on t, P ’s input and T ’s input. Let E be initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn. Since t is P ’s status in
E before P receives m, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P} has not contacted P yet and thus t can be constructed given
Ω\{Q}’s inputs. Since E is an optimistic execution, then if Stop returns a non-⊥ value, Stop returns
z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Suppose that Stop returns z to P . Then there is a computationally-bounded
algorithm that computes z given Ω\{Q}’s inputs and T ’s inputs, which gives a contradiction.
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Corollary 1. For any optimistic execution E, there exists message m∗1 such that (a) before m∗1
arrives at its destination, ∀P ∈ Ω, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P} such that Q has not contacted P yet and (b) after
m∗1 arrives at its destination, there exists the destination R of m∗1 such that ∀Q ∈ Ω\{R}, Q has
contacted R.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn, there exists message m
∗
2
such that (a) before m∗2 arrives at its destination R, no P computes z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) from P ’s
status and P ’s input (according to the protocol underlying E) and (b) after m∗2 arrives at R, R
computes z from R’s status and R’s input (according to the protocol underlying E).
In E, before R receives m∗2, ∀P ∈ Ω\{R}, P has been contacted by Q, ∀Q ∈ Ω\{P}.
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. The existence of message m∗2 follows from the optimism
property.
We prove the second part by contradiction. Suppose that in E, ∃O ∈ Ω\{R}, Q ∈ Ω\{O} such
that when R receives m∗2, O has not been contacted by Q. Consider an execution F that is the
same as E for the prefix that ends at the event of m∗2 arriving at its destination (inclusive); in F ,
after R receives m∗2, O invokes Stop, and Stop returns before any other party invokes Stop. In F ,
O is honest. By Lemma 2, O outputs ⊥. However, an honest party R outputs z, which violates
the completeness property. A contradiction.
Corollary 2. For any optimistic execution E, let m∗1 be defined as in Corollary 1 and let m∗2 be
defined as in Lemma 3; then the event of m∗1 arriving at its destination precedes the event of m∗2
arriving at its destination.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 3 and n ≥ 2.
Corollary 3. For any optimistic execution E, let m∗2 be defined as in Lemma 3 and let R be the
destination of m∗2; then in E, before R receives m∗2, ∀P ∈ Ω\{R}, P has received at least one
message.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 3 and n ≥ 2.
Hereafter, we present more properties about the two messages: m∗1 and m∗2. They are always
defined for any certain optimistic execution E. If it is clear in the context, we omit the re-definition
in the statements in the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn, let R be the destination
of m∗2; for any P ∈ Ω\{R}, let m be the last message received by P before message m∗2 arrives its
destination in E. By Corollary 3, m exists.
Let t be the status of P in E right after P receives m. Then for any execution E(P ) such that
E(P ) is the same as E for P until P invokes Stop, and P invokes Stop with t after P receives m
(and before P ’s next receipt of some message), Stop returns z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) to P .
Proof. For any E(P ), P ’s behavior is the same as an honest P to the parties in Ω\{P} and T ,
w.l.o.g., we say that in E(P ), P is honest.
Let MP be the set of messages sent by P before m∗2 arrives its destination in E. Then the
event of P receiving m is the last non-local event in E that might trigger P to send some message
in MP . Due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels and the arbitrary time instant of
invoking Stop, there exists such an execution E(P ) that P has sent all the messages inMP before
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P ’s next receipt of some message and before P invokes Stop with t. For any such execution E(P ),
the parties in Ω\{P} may continue E without noticing P ’s invocation of Stop, and then an honest
party R outputs z. Therefore, Stop should return z to P ; otherwise, as all parties are honest here,
this violates the completeness property.
Now due to the arbitrary time instant of invoking Stop, it is indistinguishable for T whether
P , invoking Stop with t, has sent all the messages in MP or not. Therefore, for any E(P ), Stop
has to return z to P .
Lemma 5. For any optimistic execution E and any k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, w.l.o.g., let m1,m2, . . . ,mk be k
messages in E such that (a) the destination of mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is Pi; (b) mi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 is the
first message received by Pi+1 after Pi receives mi in E. Let ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k be the status of Pi in E
right before Pi receives mi.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, define execution E(Pi) such that E(Pi) is the same as E for Pi until Pi invokes
Stop; in E(Pi), Pi invokes Stop with ti right before message mi arrives at Pi.
Assume that for any E(P1), if no other party invokes Stop before P1, then Stop returns ⊥ to
P1. Then
• for k = 1, for any E(Pk), when Pk invokes Stop, if no other party has invoked Stop, then
Stop returns ⊥ to Pk.
• for k = 2, for any E(Pk), when Pk invokes Stop, if Pk−1 has invoked Stop with tk−1, Stop has
returned ⊥ to Pk−1 and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to Pk except
with negligible probability.
• for 3 ≤ k ≤ n, for any E(Pk), when Pk invokes Stop if P1, P2, . . . , Pk−1 have invoked Stop
with t1, t2, . . . , tk−1 respectively and for 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Pi invokes Stop after Stop returns to
Pi−1, and Stop has returned ⊥ to P1, . . . , Pk−1, and no other party has invoked Stop, then
Stop returns ⊥ to Pk except with negligible probability.
Proof. Let E be initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn. We prove the lemma by induction. The base case,
for which k = 1, is trivial.
Suppose the statement is true for k − 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Assume any E(Pk) as an execution such
that when Pk invokes Stop, P1, . . . , Pk−1 have invoked Stop with t1, . . . , tk−1 respectively according
to the statement, Stop has returned P1, . . . , Pk−1 ⊥ and no other party has invoked Stop, and Stop
returns r to Pk, where r is a random variable.
For any E(Pk), let E
∗(Pk) be an execution that is the same as E(Pk) for P1, P2, . . . , Pn until Pk
invokes Stop right before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1. If Pj , . . . , Pk−1 for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1
do not invoke Stop before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1 in E(Pk), let Pj , . . . , Pk−1 invoke Stop
right before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1 in the same order with the same status as in E∗(Pk).
Also, let Pk invoke Stop after Stop has returned Pk−1 ⊥.
Due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels, in both E(Pk) and E
∗(Pk), Pk’s behavior
is the same as an honest Pk to Ω\Pk and T . Hereafter we say that Pk is honest. Again due to the
arbitrary delay of communication channels,, to Pk and T , any E
∗(Pk) is indistinguishable from any
E(Pk) at the point when Pk invokes Stop. Furthermore, since mk is the first message received by
Pk after Pk−1 receives mk−1 in E, the status of Pk in E∗(Pk) is also tk. Thus in any E ∗ (Pk), Stop
returns r to Pk (where the distribution of r remains the same).
For any E(Pk−1) and for any E∗(Pk), we define an execution F such that (a) F is the same as
E(Pk−1) for Pk−1 until Pk−1 invokes Stop with tk−1 right before mk−1 arrives at Pk−1; (b) F is the
same as E∗(Pk) for Pk until Pk invokes Stop with tk right before mk−1 arrives at Pk−1; (c) when
Pk invokes Stop, P1, . . . , Pk−1 have invoked Stop with t1, . . . , tk−1 respectively and Pi, 2 ≤ i ≤ k−1
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invokes Stop after Stop returns to Pi−1, Stop has returned ⊥ to P1, . . . , Pk−2 and no other party
has invoked Stop.
In F , Pk−1’s behavior is the same as an honest Pk−1 to Ω\{Pk−1} and T . Hereafter, we say
that Pk−1 is honest in F . If n = 2, then k = 2 and all parties are honest. Since the statement
is true for k − 1, Stop returns ⊥ to Pk−1 in F . Then by the completeness property, r = ⊥ with
probability 1. If n > 2, since the statement is true for k − 1, then Stop returns ⊥ to Pk−1 except
with negligible probability. When Stop returns ⊥ to Pk−1, E∗(Pk) and F are indistinguishable to
T and Pk due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels. As a result, Stop returns r to Pk
(where the distribution of r remains the same).
Then by the (weak) fairness property, r = ⊥ except with negligible probability. We can show
this by contradiction. Suppose that r 6= ⊥ with non-negligible probability. We build an algorithm
A such that (1) A controls all parties except for Pk−1 and Pk, and (2) A plays the asynchronous
network and the roles of the malicious parties such that every execution among P1, P2, . . . , Pn
satisfies F . A is a computationally-bounded algorithm such that two honest parties Pk−1 and Pk
output differently with non-negligible probability. This violates the (weak) fairness property. A
contradiction.
As a result, if the statement is true for k− 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, the statement is true for k. Therefore,
the lemma is true for any k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
Figure 2 illustrates the three key executions in the proof of lemma 5: E(Pk), E
∗(Pk), E(Pk−1).
(a) Execution E(Pk) (b) Execution E
∗(Pk)
(c) Execution F
Figure 2: The three key executions in the proof of Lemma 5. A dot line means that any event
might occur. A dashed line means that an event does not occur. A solid line means that the same
event as in E occurs.
Lemma 6. For any optimistic execution E, let R, a sequence of Ω, be the sequence of destinations
of the messages received between the two events: the event of m∗1 arriving at its destination and the
event of m∗2 arriving at its destination, inclusive.
Then R contains all the permutations of Ω as subsequences.
Proof. Let E be initialized with x1, x2, . . . , xn. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that, w.l.o.g.,
R does not include P1, P2, . . . , Pn as a subsequence.
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By Corollary 2, R starts at the destination of m∗1 and ends at the destination of m∗2; and R
includes P1 as a subsequence, which is also true for P2, . . . , Pn. Then there exists some k, 2 ≤ k ≤
n − 1 such that R includes P1, P2, . . . , Pk as a subsequence and does not include P1, P2, . . . , Pk+1
as a subsequence.
As a result, there exists a sequence m1,m2, . . . ,mk of k messages in E such that (a) the des-
tination of mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is Pi; (b) mi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 is the first message received by Pi+1 after
Pi receives mi and (c) m1 = m
∗
1, or m1 is the first message received by P1 after m
∗
1 arrives at
its destination; and (d) the event of mk arriving at Pk precedes the event of m
∗
2 arriving at its
destination. (The event of mk may also be the event of m
∗
2.)
Let t1 be the status of P1 right before P1 receives m1 in E. Define execution E(P1) such that
E(P1) is the same as E for P1 until P1 invokes Stop with t1 right before m1 arrives at P1. By
Lemma 2, for any E(P1), if no other party invokes Stop before P1, then Stop returns ⊥ to P1.
Let ti, 2 ≤ i ≤ k be the status of Pi right before Pi receives mi in E. Define execution E(Pk)
such that (a) E(Pk) is the same as E for Pk until Pk invokes Stop with tk right before message mk
arrives at Pk; (b) P1, P2, . . . , Pk−1 invoke Stop with t1, t2, . . . , tk−1 respectively; (c) for 2 ≤ i ≤ k,
Pi invokes Stop after Stop returns to Pi−1; (d) Stop returns ⊥ to P1, P2, . . . , Pk−1; and (5) no
other party has invoked Stop. By Lemma 5, Stop returns ⊥ to Pk in E(Pk) except with negligible
probability.
Let m be the last message received by Pk+1 before message m
∗
2 arrives at its destination in E. By
Corollary 3, m exists if Pk+1 is not the destination of m
∗
2. Therefore, if Pk+1 is not the destination
of m∗2, then the event of m arriving at its destination precedes the event of mk arriving at Pk in E;
otherwise, we have a subsequence P1, P2, . . . , Pk+1, which gives a contradiction. Moreover, Pk+1 is
not the destination of m∗2; otherwise, we again have a subsequence P1, P2, . . . , Pk+1, which gives a
contradiction. (If the event of mk is the event of m
∗
2, then the event of m arriving at its destination
obviously precedes the event of mk arriving at Pk in E.)
Let tk+1 be the status of Pk+1 right after Pk+1 receives m in E. Consider an execution
E(Pk, Pk+1) that is the same as E(Pk) for all the parties in Ω\{Pk+1} and is the same as E
for Pk+1 until Pk+1 invokes Stop with tk+1 after Stop has returned to Pk. Since the event of m
arriving at its destination precedes the event of message mk arriving at Pk, in E(Pk, Pk+1), we let
Pk+1 invoke Stop with tk+1 also after Pk+1 receives m.
In E(Pk, Pk+1), Pk’s behavior is the same as an honest Pk to Ω\{Pk} and T ; Pk+1’s behavior is
the same as an honest Pk+1 to Ω\{Pk+1} and T . Hereafter, we say that Pk and Pk+1 are honest in
E(Pk, Pk+1). Moreover, until Stop returns to Pk, E(Pk, Pk+1) and E(Pk) are indistinguishable to
Pk and T and therefore Stop returns ⊥ to Pk except with negligible probability also in E(Pk, Pk+1).
However, by Lemma 4, Stop returns z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) to Pk+1.
Now we build an algorithm A such that (1) A controls all parties except for Pk−1 and Pk,
and (2) A plays the asynchronous network and the roles of the malicious parties such that every
execution among P1, P2, . . . , Pn satisfies E(Pk.Pk+1). A is a computationally-bounded algorithm
such that two honest parties Pk and Pk+1 output differently with non-negligible probability. This
violates the (weak) fairness property. A contradiction.
Figure 3 illustrates two key executions in the proof of Lemma 6: E(Pk), E(Pk, Pk+1).
Now that we have all the necessary properties of any optimistic execution, we are ready to prove
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let R be defined as in Lemma 6. Then by Lemma 6, ` lower-bounds the
length of R. By the definition of m∗1, there are at least n − 2 messages that precede m∗1 in E;
otherwise, at least one party has not yet contacted the destination of m∗1. By the definition of
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(a) Execution E(Pk) (b) Execution E(Pk, Pk+1)
Figure 3: Two key executions in the proof of Lemma 6. A dot line means that any event might
occur. A dashed line means that an event does not occur. A solid line means that the same event
as in E occurs.
m∗2, there are at least n− 1 messages that follow m∗2 in E; otherwise, at least one party P cannot
compute z from P ’s input and P ’s status.
Therefore, during any optimistic execution E, the number of messages sent is at least `+ 2n−
3.
Remark 1 (Honest behavior in an execution). Usually without a protocol specification, we cannot
define any honest behavior. In the proof of Theorem 1, the honest behavior is relative to an
optimistic execution.
B Appendix. Proof of Theorem 3
We give here a detailed proof of Theorem 3. We note that this is a proof of a stand-alone execution.
This is consistent with Definition 3, which defines an isolated (n+ 1)-party case of optimistic fair
computation.
Before we present the proof, we recall the formal definition and security guarantee of verifiable
encryption from [12].
Definition 6 (Verifiable encryption [12]). Let (G,E,D) be the key generation, encryption and
decryption algorithms of a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. Let (vk, sk) be one
key pair generated by G where vk is the public key and sk is the secret key. Let R be a relation
and let LR = {x|∃w such that (x,w) ∈ R}. A verifiable encryption scheme for a relation R consists
of a two-party protocol (P, V ) and a recovery algorithm D. P and V take as common inputs: vk,
x, R (and some condition κ to open string α). P takes witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R as an extra
input. V rejects (i.e., outputs ⊥), or accepts and obtains string α. D takes as inputs: sk, α (and
κ). D outputs a witness wˆ if κ is verified.
A verifiable encryption scheme is secure if it satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: If P and V are honest, then V accepts in the two-party protocol for all (vk, sk)
and for all x ∈ LR.
• Validity : For any computationally-bounded algorithm Pˆ , for all (vk, sk), if V accepts and
obtains string α in the two-party protocol with Pˆ , then given α and sk, D outputs a witness
wˆ such that (x, wˆ) /∈ R with negligible probability.
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• Computational zero-knowledge: For every algorithm Vˆ , there exists an expected polynomial-
time simulator S given vk and x, and with black-box access to Vˆ such that for all x ∈ LR, the
output of Vˆ after the two-party protocol with an honest P is computationally indistinguishable
from the output of S.
Furthermore, for the simplicity of the proof, we consider the particular verifiable encryption
scheme proposed in [12]. As [12] pointed out, their construction of verifiable encryption can be
made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir heuristic [38]; the resulting non-interactive variant is secure
in the random oracle model [39]. For the non-interactive variant, it is easy to see that the algorithm
V in the scheme is deterministic; i.e., given the one message sent by Pˆ , either V rejects (with
probability 1) or V accepts (with probability 1); and the recovery algorithm D in the scheme is
also deterministic; i.e., given sk, κ and α, either D rejects (with probability 1) or D outputs a
witness (with probability 1).
Proof of Theorem 3. As shown in Algorithm 1, the number of messages is equal to the length of
sequence j which is l + 2n − 3. Thus the n parties exchange exactly l + 2n − 3 messages in pi. In
what follows, we verify that our protocol satisfies Definition 3 and Definition 4.
Optimism. If P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow pi in which
all parties output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without interacting with T .
Non-triviality. As shown in Algorithm 1, if messages are delivered instantly, then P1, P2, . . . , Pn
do not invoke Stop; therefore, we find one execution of pi that P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none
invokes Stop.
Completeness. If P1, P2, . . . , Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow pi and
output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Next, we show by contradiction that if all parties are honest and some
invokes Stop, then either all parties output ⊥ or all parties output z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Suppose
that an honest party P outputs ⊥ and an honest party Q outputs z. Since P outputs ⊥, then either
(1) pi has not started, or (2) P = Pjk and 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, or (3) P = Pjk and n ≤ k ≤ l + 2n − 3
For cases (1) and (2), since by Equation (2),
mk =
{
mk−1||V Ejk ||Sigjk(mk−1||V Ejk) 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
V Ej0 k = 0,
P has not sent V Ejk . Again by Equation (2), mend(jk) = mend(jk)−1||xjk ||Sigjk(mend(jk)−1||xjk).
Since end(jk) > n− 1, P has not sent xjk . Since all parties are honest, Q does not output z from
running pi or µ in cases (1) and (2).
In case (3), since all parties are honest, by the completeness property of verifiable encryption,
and the definition of digital signatures, T accepts that reqk and P = Pjk ’s claim are consistent.
As P is honest, P has not sent a request before. In case (3), we consider two disjoint cases: (a)
∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V Ei is not in reqk, and (b) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V Ei is in reqk.
Consider case (3.a). By Equation (2), ∀ix ≥ n − 1, mix contains V E1, V E2, . . . , V En. Then
0 ≤ lastk ≤ n − 2. Since j0, j1, . . . , jn−1 are different from each other, jk 6= jn−1. Moreover,
k = minix∈{n,n+1,...,l+2n−3}{ix|jix = jk} ≤ end(jk). Therefore, P has not sent xjk , and Q cannot
output xjk following pi.
Clearly, if Q does not interact with T , then Q outputs ⊥, and furthermore, if Q interacts with
T before P interacts with T , then Q also outputs ⊥. If Q interacts with T after P interacts with
T , then we assume that Q sends a request reqq to T . Since Q is honest, T accepts that reqq
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is consistent with Q’s claim that Q has not received mq−1 (but has received mlastq−1). By the
definition of i, q ≤ endjq. (Otherwise, we do not have jk, jq as a subsequence of i). In addition,
since Q is honest, q ≤ minix∈{k+1,k+2,...,l+2n−3}{ix|jix = jq}. Therefore, T sends “aborted” to Q.
In case (3.b), w.l.o.g., assume that P is the earliest process that sends to T a request and
receives “aborted”. Then variable progress is 0 at T when P sends reqk. Then we have
k ≤ min
ix∈{1,2,...,l+2n−3}
{ix|jix = jk} , first(jk).
If jk 6= j0, k ≤ n − 1, which gives a contradiction. If jk = j0, then since k ≤ first(jk), lastk = 0;
thus reqk = mlastk = V Ej0 , which also gives a contradiction for n ≥ 2.
Termination. As shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, an honest party either follows pi and
outputs, or wants to stop, follows µ and outputs. Since any message between an honest party and
T eventually reaches its destination, an honest party eventually outputs.
Fairness. We prove that for any e ∈ N, 1 ≤ e ≤ n−1, any e malicious parties Pd1 , Pd2 , . . . , Pde , and
any computationally-bounded algorithm A, there exists a computationally-bounded algorithm S
such that the joint outputs OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are com-
putationally indistinguishable for any x1, x2, . . . , xn.
We construct S that runs A as a black-box as follows.
1. S generates n+1 key pairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2), . . . , (pkn, skn), (vkT , skT ); and then S invokes
A and initializesA with inputs xd1 , xd2 , . . . , xde , n+1 parties’ public keys pk1, pk2, . . . , pkn, pkT
and malicious parties’ private keys skd1 , skd2 , . . . , skde .
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2. S plays the role of the n − k honest parties Ph1 , Ph2 , . . . , Phn−e and T , and executes our
protocol honestly with A except that:
• If by Algorithm 1, S has to send the (k−1)th message for 1 ≤ k ≤ n on behalf of an honest
party, then by the construction of Fiat-Shamir paradigm [38] and the computational zero-
knowledge property of verifiable encryption, S can simulate the random oracle [39] and
invoke the simulator (defined in the computational zero-knowledge property) to compute
message mˆk−1 (that is computationally indistinguishable from the (k − 1)th message
except with negligible probability).
• If by Algorithm 1, S has to send the (k−1)th message for end(jk−1)+1 ≤ k ≤ l+n−2 on
behalf of an honest party Psrc, then S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de
respectively to U . S obtains a response from U , which contains xh1 , xh2 , . . . , xhn−e . Then
S uses xsrc to compute message mˆk−1. (How to obtain xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde is explained
later.)
• If by Algorithm 2, S has to send a response including the Ph1 , Ph2 , . . . , Phn−e ’s inputs
on behalf of T , then S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de respec-
tively to U . S obtains a response from U , which contains xh1 , xh2 , . . . , xhn−e . S uses
xh1 , xh2 , . . . , xhn−e to compute a response. (How to obtain xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde is explained
later.)
16Both A and S are also initialized with public information, including the relations κ =
(a1, R1)||(a2, R2)|| · · · ||(an, Rn), the algorithms of our protocol and in particular, the deterministic strategy of
when to invoke Stop for every honest party.
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• (S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de respectively only once to U .)17
3. In addition, S executes the following.
• If according to an honest party P ’s strategy of invoking Stop and µ, at some point in
the execution with A, P invokes Stop and outputs ⊥, then S sends ⊥ on behalf of an
arbitrary party in P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de to U . If S ever sends ⊥, S sends ⊥ only once.
• S saves xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde by decrypting V Ed1 , V Ed2 , . . . , V Ede from the messages ex-
changed with A (in pi or µ).
4. Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs.
We verify that S has saved xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde before when S has to send a message that contains
at least one honest party’s input. If by Algorithm 1, S has to send the (k − 1)th message for
end(jk−1) + 1 ≤ k ≤ l + n − 2, then S has received and verified the (k − 2)th message. By the
definition of sequence i, if jk−1 = jn−1, then end(jk−1) ≥ n+1; if jk−1 6= jn−1, then the first symbol
of i is not jk−1 and thus end(jk−1) ≥ n. In either case, k ≥ n+1, and therefore the (k−2)th message
includes V Ed1 , V Ed2 , . . . , V Ede . If by Algorithm 2, S has to send a response on behalf of T , then
S has verified the corresponding request, which also includes verified V Ed1 , V Ed2 , . . . , V Ede . Thus,
by the validity property of verifiable encryption, S successfully decrypts xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde such that
{adi , xˆdi} ∈ Rdi ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , e} except negligible probability.
We also verify that S does not send ⊥ and xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde to U in the same execution, except
with negligible probability in a separate lemma (Lemma 7, which is given and proved later).
To show that the joint outputs OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
are computationally indistinguishable, we first consider the transcript between S and A, and the
transcript among P1, P2, . . . , Pn and A. By the computational zero-knowledge property of verifiable
encryption and the definition of S, any computationally-bounded algorithm A cannot distinguish
the two transcripts except with negligible probability. Let F be any execution between A and S
in the game above when S is well-defined.18 W.l.o.g., in F , honest parties played by S output
according to Algorithm 1. Denote by OF the joint output of P1, P2, . . . , Pn and A in F . Then OF
and OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are computationally indistinguishable.
We next consider the execution G among P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n,S and U when S runs F . We compare
the joint output OF with the joint output OG of P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n,S in G as follows. S’s output is
the same as A’s output. For any honest party Phi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− e}, we show that P¯hi outputs
the same. There are three possibilities for Phi : Phi either (1) invokes Stop and outputs ⊥, or (2)
invokes Stop and outputs a non-⊥ value, or (3) does not invoke Stop but outputs a non-⊥ value.
In case (1), S sends ⊥ to U and thus in G, P¯hi also outputs ⊥. In case (2), (a) if Phi interacts
with T , then S uses U ’s response as T ’s response to Phi ; (b) if not, then to Phi , pi finishes and S
must have obtained U ’s response to query inputs for honest parties including Phi . Thus whether
Phi interacts with T or not, P¯hi also outputs the same. Case (3) is the same as case (2.b). Then
OF and OG have the same distribution.
As a result, OG and OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are computationally indistinguishable. Denote
by event the event that S is not well-defined. Since event occur with negligible probability, OG
17We note that on behalf of T , when S has to verify the ciphertexts of verifiable encryption in a request, S only
verifies those ciphertexts V Ed1 , V Ed2 , . . . , V Ede (as S creates the others).
18With negligible probability, S is not well-defined. I.e., S cannot simulate the game above with A, for example,
when the simulator defined in the computational zero-knowledge property of verifiable encryption exceeds polynomial
time, when S decrypts xˆdi such that (adi , xˆdi) /∈ Rdi for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , e}, and when some honest party outputs
⊥ but S still has to send a response that includes honest parties’ inputs.
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and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are computationally indistinguishable. Then S a computationally-
bounded algorithm such that for any x1, x2, . . . , xn such that OP1,P2,...,Pn,A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and
OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n,S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are computationally indistinguishable.
Next, we give the necessary lemma, which we use to verify that S as defined in the proof of
Theorem 3 does not send conflicting messages to U except with negligible probability. However,
instead of discussing S, we state the lemma in a more general but equivalent way.
Lemma 7 (Simulation of S). By Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, for any e ∈ N, 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1
and any e malicious parties Pd1 , Pd2 , . . . , Pde, for any computationally-bounded algorithm A that
controls the e malicious parties, ∀x1, x2, . . . , xn, for any honest party P ,
• either P outputs ⊥ with negligible probability,
• or P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible probability and given that an honest party P outputs ⊥,
any other party Q outputs the honest parties’ inputs except with negligible probability.
By Lemma 7, for S, as defined in the proof of Theorem 3, when S has to send ⊥ to U with
non-negligible probability, the probability that S has to send non-⊥ inputs to U is negligible.
Lemma 7 also implies the inverse: if a party outputs the honest parties’ inputs with non-negligible
probability, then an honest party P outputs ⊥ with negligible probability. In other words, when S
has to send non-⊥ inputs to U with non-negligible probability, the probability that S has to send
⊥ to U is negligible.
Proof of Lemma 7. We need only to prove the case where P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible proba-
bility.
Since P is honest, then either (1) pi has not started, or (2) P = Pjk for 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, or
(3) P = Pjk for n ≤ k ≤ l + 2n − 3. (Some intermediary results are already deduced for the
completeness property in the proof of Theorem 3 and is thus not repeated here.)
In cases (1) and (2), P has not sent xjk or V Ejk and thus by the property of (ajk , Rjk), any
computationally-bounded algorithm outputs x with negligible probability. In case (3), since P is
honest, then by the determinism of the verification algorithm V of verifiable encryption, T accepts
that reqk is consistent with P ’s claim, and in addition, P has not sent a request before. When P
interacts with T , at least one of the two holds: (a) ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V Ei is not in reqk, or (b)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V Ei is in reqk.
In case (3.a), P has not sent xjk . If Q interacts with T before P interacts with T , then T
sends “aborted” to Q. If Q interacts with T after P interacts with T , then we assume that Q
sends a request reqq. We show that the following two events occur at the same time with negligible
probability: event A is q > minix∈{k+1,k+2,...,l+2n−3}{ix|jix = jq} , nextk(q) and event B is that
Q passes the consistency verification of reqq at T . We show this by contradiction. Suppose that
the two events occur at the same time with non-negligible probability. Since q > nextk(q), then
lastq ≥ nextk(q) > k; therefore, reqq includes message mk which includes P ’s signature on message
mk−1. Then Q is a computationally algorithm which forges P ’s signature on mk−1 (which P has
not signed before) with non-negligible probability, a contradiction to the unforgeability of digital
signatures. Therefore, A and B occur at the same time with negligible probability. Let A¯ be the
complement of A and let B¯ be the complement of B. Then A¯ ∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible
probability. Since nextk(q) ≤ end(jq) ≤ l + n − 2, T sends “aborted” to Q except with negligible
probability. If Q does not interact with T , then Q only obtains V Ejk from pi. Thus by the
property of (ajk , Rjk) and by the computational zero-knowledge property of verifiable encryption,
any computationally-bounded algorithm outputs x with negligible probability.
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In case (3.b), since k ≤ l + n − 2, then by the definition of end, k ≤ end(jk). By Equation
(2), P has not sent x. Similar to case (3.b), If Q does not interact with T , then Q only obtains
V Ejk from pi. Clearly, if Q interacts with T but T sends “aborted” to Q except with negligible
probability, then by the property of (ajk , Rjk) and the computational zero-knowledge property of
verifiable encryption, the probability that Q outputs xjk is negligible.
We show by contradiction that Q interacts with T but T sends “aborted” to Q except with
negligible probability. Suppose that Q interacts with T but T sends a non-“aborted” value to Q
with non-negligible probability. Assume that Q sends a request reqq to T . Let pg be the value of
the variable progress at T when Q starts to interact with T . Let event A be q > nextpg(q) and
let event B be the event that Q passes the consistency verification of reqq at T . Then similar to
case (3.a), A¯∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible probability. If B¯ occurs, then T sends “aborted” to
Q. Since A¯ ∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible probability, then A¯ ∩ B occurs with non-negligible
probability. Clearly, if the recovery of the inputs from their ciphertexts of verifiable encryption
is not successful, then the condition κ is not satisfied and T sends “aborted” to Q. However, by
the validity property of verifiable encryption, given that B occurs, the unsuccessful recovery occurs
with negligible probability. In what follows, we consider the case where A¯ ∩ B occurs and the
recovery for Q is successful.
W.l.o.g., Q is the first process that receives a non-“aborted” value from T . Then since Q is the
first process that receives a non-“aborted” value, by the validity property of verifiable encryption,
pg ≥ l + n− 2 except with negligible probability.
When Q invokes µ with request reqq, the variable z at T is ⊥. By Algorithm 2, thus T updates
progress in a specific way: progress is first updated with request reqI1 where I1 is the first index
of jI1 in the suffix j[n−1 :] of sequence j, and then each update is with such a request reqI2 that I2
is the first index of jI2 in the suffix j[progress+ 1 :]. Let α be the sequence of parties who invoke
µ and trigger T to update progress before Pjq invokes µ for reqq. Let σ be the sequence of the
subscripts of those parties.
Since pg ≥ l+n−2 except with negligible probability, σ is a subsequence of i = j[n−1 : l+n−2]
and, moreover, must be the prefix of some permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n} in i except with negligible
probability.
Clearly, if T returns a non-“aborted” to Q, then q ≥ l + n − 1. Since A¯ occurs, nextpg(q) ≥
l + n− 1. When pg ≥ l + n− 2, since σ ends at jpg (inclusive) and there is no jq between jpg and
jnext−1, jq must occur in σ. (Otherwise, as next ≥ l + n − 1, there is no hope for σ to include jq
in the permutation before jl+n−2 (inclusive), contradictory to the definition of i.) In other words,
Pjq must have invoked µ before, except with non-negligible probability. Then T returns “aborted”
to Q for reqq except with negligible probability. A contradiction.
Thus, we conclude that when P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible probability, then given that
an honest party P outputs ⊥, any other party Q outputs the honest parties’ inputs except with
negligible probability.
26
